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Abstract
This Note argues that U.S. courts should adopt a uniform approach in assessing litigants’
conduct to adjudicate art theft disputes. Part I discusses the history of the UNESCO Convention
and the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (the “CPIA” or ”Implementation
Act”) and sets forth article 7(b) of the Convention which bans the import of stolen cultural property.
Part II highlights the uncertainty in U.S. state and federal courts’ application of common law
principles to controversies concerning title to stolen art. Part III advocates the application of
uniform standards in the adjudication of art theft disputes and the reconciliation of the conflict
between article 7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention and U.S. jurisprudence. This Note concludes
that international art theft litigants must be subject to evenhanded judicial treatment that embraces
the spirit of the UNESCO Convention, while applying the letter of the Implementation Act to
facilitate the return of cultural property to its country of origin.
NOTE
INTERNATIONAL ART THEFT DISPUTES:
HARMONIZING COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
WITH ARTICLE 7(b) OF THE UNESCO
CONVENTION
Of all facts concerning art, this is the one most necessary to be known,
that, while manufacture is the work of hands only, art is the work of
the whole spirit of man. I
INTRODUCTION
The demand for cultural property2 by investment-driven
1. JOHN RUSKIN, The Queen ofthe Air, in 19 THE WORKS OFJOHN RUSKIN 391 (com-
plete ed. 1905).
2. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
("UNESCO") has broadly defined the term cultural property as "property which, on
religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of im-
portance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science." UNESCO
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S.
231, 10 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention or Convention], codified in part
in Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613
(1988) [hereinafter Implementation Act or CPIA]. Article 1 of the UNESCO Con-
vention lists categories of cultural property. Id. These categories include
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy,
and objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science and
technology and military and social history, to the life of national
leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of national
importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites
which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins
and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on
any support and in any material (excluding industrial designs
and manufactured articles decorated by hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
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societies has engendered an increase in international art theft.'
As a result, disputes often arise between the owner and the
possessor of cultural property.4 Courts in the United States
have become an often-used forum to resolve international art
theft disputes.' The United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Own-
ership of Cultural Property (the "UNESCO Convention" or
the "Convention") provides a framework for resolving dis-
putes over cultural property.6 U.S. courts, however, do not ap-
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary,
etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical
instruments.
UNESCO Convention, 823 U.N.T.S. at 234-36, 10 I.L.M. at 289-90.
Cultural property embodies a nation's heritage, reflecting its history, religion,
anthropology, scientific knowlege, artistic expression, and other aesthetic values in a
tangible form. Id. art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236-37, 10 I.L.M. at 291. An individual or
the collective genius of nationals may create cultural property providing a symbol for
contemporary societies to relate to their cultural heritage. Id. art. 4, 823 U.N.T.S. at
234-36, 10 I.L.M. at 289-90.
3. See James A.R. Nafziger, An Anthro-Apology for Managing the International Flow of
Cultural Property, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 189 (1982) (discussing inadequacy of import-
export controls over cultural property); Karen S. Jore, Note, The Illicit Movement of Art
and Artifact, 13 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 55, 55-56 (1987) (discussing pillaging of artifacts
from archaeological sites); see also Judith Hennessee, Great Art, CONNOISSEUR MAGA-
ZINE, July 1990, at 42 (discussing 1989 art theft of Gardner Museum in Boston with
estimated loss at over US$200 million).
4. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. 1980). The court noted
that disputes concerning title are a serious problem and that the explosion in art
thefts is a worldwide phenomenon reaching epidemic proportions. Id. (relying on
affidavit of International Foundation for Art Research); see also Constance Lowenthal,
Purloined Porcelain, WALL ST.J., Sept. 30, 1991, at AI0. Seegenerally, RIDHA FRAOUA, LE
TRAFIC ILLICITE DES BIENS CULTURELS ET LEUR RESTITUTION (1985); LYNDEL V.
PRo-rr & P.J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE (1989).
5. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990); John Henry Merryman, The
Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 340 n.7 (1989) (describing
United States as nation to which cultural property flows); see also William Honan,
Avarice and Audacity in Texas, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 11, 1991, at A28 (discussing recent suit
by German government to recover art works taken by U.S. soldier during World War
II).
6. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289; seeJohn
B. Gordon, Comment, The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art Treasures,
12 HARV. INT'L LJ. 537 (1971).
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ply the principles of the UNESCO Convention.7 Rather, U.S.
courts apply both common law and equitable principles gov-
erning personal property to determine the rightful owner of
cultural property. 8 The application of these principles has re-
sulted in conflicting judicial standards for factually complex art
theft cases. 9
This Note argues that U.S. courts should adopt a uniform
approach in assessing litigants' conduct to adjudicate art theft
disputes. Part I discusses the history of the UNESCO Conven-
tion and the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act (the "CPIA" or "Implementation Act") and sets forth arti-
cle 7(b) of the Convention which bans the import of stolen cul-
tural property. Part II highlights the uncertainty in U.S. state
and federal courts' application of common law principles to
controversies concerning title to stolen art. Part III advocates
the application of uniform standards in the adjudication of art
theft disputes and the reconciliation of the conflict between ar-
ticle 7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention and U.S. jurispru-
dence. This Note concludes that international art theft liti-
gants must be subject to evenhanded judicial treatment that
embraces the spirit of the UNESCO Convention, while apply-
ing the letter of the Implementation Act to facilitate the return
of cultural property to its country of origin.
7. See Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 297 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (noting that Imple-
mentation Act was not applicable to art theft case before court because cause of ac-
tion arose prior to effective date of act); see infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text
(discussing reasons for Convention's inapplicability).
8. See Autocephalous, 917 F.2d 278; DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); infra notes 58-186 and accompanying text
(discussing U.S. courts' application of common law and equitable principles in art
theft disputes); see also Barbara B. Rosecrance, Note, Harmonious Meeting: The McClain
Decision and the Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 311, 321
(1986). The bulk of litigation remains in the form of a civil action for replevin in
which courts treat cultural property as unique chattel. Id. However, criminal prose-
cutions also have been instituted under the provisions of the National Stolen Prop-
erty Act. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1988). See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Reflections on Criminal Jurisdiction in International Protection of Cultural Property, 10 SYRA-
CUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 281 (1983).
9. See infra notes 72-186 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting judicial
standards).
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I. THE UNESCO CONVENTION
A. Background and Legislative History of the UNESCO Convention
and Implementation Act
The UNESCO Convention resulted from a deliberative
political process influenced by the competing interests of
source-nations and market-nations.'" The interests of "art
rich" source nations centers on preserving their cultural heri-
tage by retaining art works." These interests compete with
those of market nations in which investors and cultural institu-
tions acquire art works and encourage the art trade.' 2
The UNESCO Convention recognizes the moral obliga-
tion of State Parties to respect each other's cultural heritage."'
It seeks to eliminate barriers to understanding between nations
caused by one country's exploitation of another's cultural
property. "4 It also strives to foster international cooperation
to prevent the depletion of a signatory nation's cultural heri-
tage caused by the illicit transfer of ownership of cultural prop-
erty. 15
10. See Merryman, supra note 5, at 340. Cultural property originates from
source-nations, such as Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, Germany, Italy, and China. Id.
Market-nations are those to which cultural property tends to gravitate, such as Swit-
zerland, the United States, and Japan. See id.; see also John Henry Merryman, The
Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 477, 479 n.5 (1988). See generally
Jonathan S. Moore, Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97 YALE
LJ. 466 (1988).
11. See Merryman, supra note 10, at 478-79 (discussing cultural property "reten-
tion schemes" as form of export control found mostly in nations rich in cultural arti-
facts).
12. Id. at 500. Cultural property is valuable to. market nations because it can
exact a high price on the international market as an economic investment. Id. It can
also enhance the local economy by providing a tourist attraction. See id.
13. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 823 U.N.T.S. at 232, 10 I.L.M. at
289. The preamble of the UNESCO Convention states that "[it is essential for every
State to become increasingly alive to the moral obligations to respect its own cultural
heritage and that of all nations." Id.
14. Id.; see Gordon, supra note 6, at 540-41 (discussing tensions between nations
caused by international illicit art trade).
15. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(1), 823 U.N.T.S. at 236, 10 I.L.M.
at 290. Article 2(1) of the UNESCO Convention provides that
[t]he States Parties to this Convention recognize that the illicit import, ex-
port and transfer of ownership of cultural property is one of the main causes
of the impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the countries of origin of
such property and that international co-operation constitutes one of the
most efficient means of protecting each countries [sic] cultural property
against all the dangers resulting therefrom.
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The UNESCO 'Convention provides numerous mecha-
nisms to control the illicit transfer of cultural property. The
Convention provides for the development of national services
to assist in the protection of cultural property and for the use
of export certificates. 6 In addition, the Convention requires
signatory nations to maintain a cultural property registration
system and to establish penalties for violations of import or
export prohibitions.17 It mandates the recovery and return of
illegally exported or stolen items and requires the develop-
ment of measures to prohibit art institutions from acquiring
illegally exported artifacts.' 8
Furthermore, the Convention creates a cause of action to
recover illegally acquired cultural property.' 9 This provision
effectuates the Convention's premise that cultural property is
inalienable and that signatory nations therefore have an inde-
feasible right to its return. 20 Another provision functions as an
emergency measure, allowing a complete import prohibition
on property that is subject to widespread pillaging.2'
In 1972, the United States became a party to the UNESCO
Convention.22 The U.S. Congress recognized that the United
States was a principal market for stolen or illegally exported
archaeological artifacts and art objects. 23 The flow of unau-
thorized artifacts strained foreign relations with the countries
d.
16. Id. arts. 5-6, 823 U.N.T.S. at 238-40, 10 I.L.M. at 290-91.
17. Id. arts. 8, 10, 823 U.N.T.S. at 242, 10 I.L.M. at 291.
18. Id. art. 7, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 291.
19. Id. art. 13, 823 U.N.T.S. at 244, 10 I.L.M. at 291-92; see infra note 237 (pro-
viding text of article 13).
20. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, art. 13, 823 U.N.T.S. at 244, 10 I.L.M.
at 291-92.
21. Id. art. 9, 823 U.N.T.S. at 242, 10 I.L.M. at 291. Article 9 is one of two
substantive provisions in the Convention and functions to prevent the depletion of
archaeological or ethnological materials. Id.; see Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the Interna-
tional Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 339-40 (1982).
22. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972). For the legislative
history of U.S. accession to the Convention, see S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4098-111. The Senate's advice and con-
sent to ratification was unanimous. Id.
23. See S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4098-111. The U.S. Secretary of State urged the U.S. Congress
to implement the Convention. The U.S. Congress stressed that the United States
should assist in returning cultural property based on principle, good foreign rela-
tions, and concern for the preservation of humanity's cultural heritage. Id.
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of origin, which were often allies.24 The United States ratified
the Convention in the belief that international cooperation was
necessary to mitigate the adverse effect on foreign relations
caused by the illicit trade in cultural property.25
In 1983, Congress enacted the Implementation Act, codi-
fying the UNESCO Convention. 26 The primary objectives of
the CPIA are to prohibit the importation of stolen cultural
property from the institutions of other signatory nations, to as-
sist in the recovery of cultural property, to exercise import
controls over cultural property, and to facilitate legal actions to
recover cultural property upon request by a State Party. 7
The CPIA is inapplicable under certain circumstances.
First, the Implementation Act applies only to stolen cultural
property that is accessioned28 to a public institution.29 Second,
it applies only to cultural property stolen after the statute's ef-
24. See id. Those governments that were victimized by the outflow of cultural
property to foreign lands protested and requested repatriation of the property upon
its subsequent appearance in the United States. Id. The U.S. Secretary of State em-
phasized that clandestine excavations frequently destroyed the scientific value of ob-
jects, and noted that architectural complexes of ancient civilizations were mutilated,
stone sculptures removed, and churches robbed. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972); see also Final Report on the UNESCO Convention, U.N.
Doc. SHC/MD/5 Annex 1, at 20 (1970) (discussing countries' concern over illegal
excavations and destruction of cultural property).
25. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972).
26. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446,
Title III, 96 Stat. 2351 (1983) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1988)); see supra
note 2. For the legislative history of the Implementation Act, see S. REP. No. 564,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4098-111; see alsoJOSEPH M.
SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1108-09 (3d ed. 1988) (discuss-
ing necessity of implementing legislation for internal law to conform to non-self-
executing treaty in order to bind U.S. courts).
27. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972). The CPIA also
provides a mechanism by which, at the request of a foreign country, the U.S. Customs
Service can enforce, to a limited degree, a foreign nation's export laws in this coun-
try. However, to do so a bilateral or multilateral agreement must exist between the
United States and that country. See Moore, supra note 10, at 472-73 n.36.
28. See Bancorp Leasing and Fin. Corp. v. Stadeli Pump & Constr., Inc., 739
P.2d 548, 551 (Ore. 1987) (stating that accession occurs when goods of two different
owners are jointly incorporated, so that title to resulting product goes to owner of
principal goods); see also LAW & COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY IN FIVE LANGUAGES 14
(1985) (defining accession as principle derived from civil law by which owner of prop-
erty becomes entitled to all that such property produces and all that owner adds or
unites to it as result of labor or skill). See generally Deaccessioning, Disposition, and the
Pledge of Museum Collections: The Legal Parameters, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM AD-
MINISTRATION 109 (1991) (discussing "deaccessioning" as involving process and pol-
icy for removal of art object from museum's collection for later sale or exchange).
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fective date, January 12, 1983, or after the date of the Conven-
tion's entry into force for the requesting State Party, whichever
is later.3 0 These conditions may render the CPIA inapplicable
in many judicial proceedings to recover stolen cultural prop-
erty, thus the need to modify state common law tort principles
and adopt the uniform approach proposed herein."
B. Article 7 of the UNESCO Convention
Article 7 is one of two major substantive provisions of the
UNESCO Convention.3 2 It requires the governments of signa-
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (1988) (prohibiting importation of documented cultural
property).
30. Id. § 2610 (providing effective date).
31. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 297 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (not-
ing CPIA's inapplicability due to effective date); see also Graham J. Dickson, Note, The
Need for a National Registry of Cultural Objects, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 839, 848-49 &
n.72 (1988) (discussing CPIA's inapplicability to dispute concerning Lydian arti-
facts); infra notes 187-265 and accompanying text (discussing need for uniform stan-
dards).
32. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 291.
Article 7 directs that
[t]he State parties to this Convention undertake:
(a) To take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation,
to prevent museums and similar institutions within their territories from ac-
quiring cultural property originating in another State Party which has been
illegally exported after entry into force of this Convention, in the States con-
cerned. Whenever possible, to inform a State of origin Party to this Con-
vention of an offer of such cultural property illegally removed from that
State after the entry into force of this Convention in both States;
(b)(i) to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a museum
or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution in another
State Party to this Convention after the entry into force of this Convention
for the States concerned, provided that such property is documented as ap-
pertaining to the inventory of that institution;
(b)(ii) at the request of the State Party of origin, to take appropriate
steps to recover and return any such cultural property imported after the
entry into force of this Convention in both States concerned, provided, how-
ever, that the requesting State shall pay just compensation to an innocent
purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that property. Requests for
recovery and return shall be made through diplomatic offices. The request-
ing Party shall furnish, at its expense, the documentation and other evidence
necessary to establish its claim for recovery and return. The parties shall
impose no customs duties or other charges upon cultural property returned
pursuant to this Article. All expenses incident to the return and delivery of
the cultural property shall be borne by the requesting Party.
Id.; codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2607, 2609 (1988); see supra note 21 (discussing other
substantive provision in article 9).
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tory nations to thwart the illicit trade in cultural property by
proscribing the transfer of stolen or unregistered art. 33 Sub-
section (a) of article 7 prohibits a signatory nation from im-
porting an artifact that does not have an export certificate au-
thorizing its transfer outside another signatory nation's terri-
tory.34 Article 7(b) bans the importation of cultural property
"stolen" from a museum or a religious or secular public monu-
ment. 5
1. Subsection (a)
Subsection (a) of article 7 provides that parties to the
UNESCO Convention agree to undertake necessary measures
to prevent the acquisition of illegally exported cultural prop-
erty from another signatory nation.3 6 The term "necessary
measures" is broad and discretionary.3 7 The Convention may
require, by implication, that a State Party initiate a judicial ac-
tion or administrative procedures for the acquisition of art
treasures, cooperate by providing information as to the where-
abouts of illicit cultural property, and assist "wherever possi-
ble" in searching for the location and recovery of illicit cultural
property.38
Article 7(a) applies only to government-controlled muse-
ums and similar institutions.3 9 In the United States, the
UNESCO Convention only covers the acquisition policies of
federally-controlled organizations.4" The vast majority of cul-
33. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972). Congress under-
stood that article 7 does "not affect existing remedies available in state or federal
courts." Id.
Unregistered artifacts are termed "illegally exported" in article 7(a) and refer
only to cultural property exported in violation of article 6. Id. Pursuant to article 6,
illegally exported objects are those that lack an export certificate. UNESCO Conven-
tion, supra note 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 290-91, codified in 19 U.S.C.
§ 2606 (1988).
34. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 291.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. S. ExEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1972). The U.S. Senate
understood that the provision requiring implementation of "necessary measures"
would be subject to the signatory nation's laws. S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4098-4100.
38. See S. ExEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972).
39. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 291;
see Bator, supra note 21, at 380.
40. S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972). The Senate stated that
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tural property in the United States, however, resides in state or
private collections.4' Consequently, the provision's impact is
greatly reduced in the United States because it only applies to
a minority of the entities that maintain art works.4 2
2. Subsection (b)
Article 7(b)(i) requires signatory nations to prohibit the
importation of cultural property stolen from a museum, reli-
gious, or secular institution.43 "Cultural property" as defined
in article 1 and protected by article 7(b)(i) is limited to objects
that are documented as belonging to the collections of public
institutions and that are therefore considered national
treasures.44  Public institutions register artifacts by docu-
menting them in their inventory and providing a registration
certificate upon the transfer of an object. 45 These documenta-
tion procedures establish the provenance of the artifact and
vest clear title to the property in the State Party.46 As a result,
the artifact's owner is undisputed, thereby facilitating recovery
of lost artifacts.47 Consequently, the enforcement of article
7(b)(i) depends on the establishment of procedures to docu-
ment the provenance48 of artifacts.49
Article 7(b)(ii) requires that upon the request of a signa-
tory nation a state party must take appropriate steps to recover
"[t]he United States understands article 7(a) to apply to institutions whose acquisi-
tion policy is subject to national control under existing domestic legislation and not
to require the enactment of new legislation to establish national control over other
institutions." Id. The provision only affects federally-controlled institutions such as
the National Gallery of Art and the Smithsonian Institution. See Bator, supra note 21,
at 380.
41. See Bator, supra note 21, at 380.
42. See id. (discussing affected entities).
43. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(b)(i), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10
I.L.M. at 291.
44. Id. art. 7(b)(i), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 290; see supra note 32 (con-
taining text of article 7).
45. See Bator, supra note 21, at 329 (discussing export documentation).
46. Id. (discussing vesting of title).
47. Id.
48. See Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (App. Div. 1979) (defining prove-
nance as history of ownership or right to possess or sell art object), aff'd, 421 N.E. 2d
500 (N.Y. 1981); see also Michael Kimmelman, Absolutely Real? Absolutely Fake?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 1, 25 (discussing recent controversy
concerning authenticity of ancient Greek statue because no documented history or
provenance exists).
49. See Bator, supra note 21, at 378 (discussing enforcement of article 7).
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and return stolen cultural property that is located within its
territorial limits. 50  This subsection is particularly important
because it provides substantive remedies for the complaining
state party as well as for the state party or individual in posses-
sion of the disputed cultural property.5' It states that, to effect
the recovery and return of the cultural property, the request-
ing nation must pay just compensation to an innocent pur-
chaser or to a person who has valid title to the property.52
Article 7 both prohibits illicit trade in art and provides eq-
uitable remedies to facilitate the return of national treasures to
signatory nations, thereby aiding countries in preserving their
cultural heritage. 53 This article stresses the Convention's in-
tent to thwart the illicit transfer of cultural property.54 The
Convention, a comprehensive multinational agreement for the
protection of cultural property in peacetime, provides for the
"interchange of cultural property" among signatory nations.55
The Convention's principles are at odds, however, with
common law principles. 56 Moreover, U.S. jurisprudence con-
50. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(b), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M.
at 290.
51. Id., art. 7(b)(ii), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 290 (requiring signatory
nations "to take appropriate steps to recover and return any such cultural prop-
erty").
52. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2609 (1988).
53. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, arts. 7, 9, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240-42, 10
I.L.M. at 290-91 (requiring just compensation to innocent purchaser for return of
property and providing for emergency measures to protect property threatened with
pillaging).
54. Id. arts. 3, 7, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236, 240, 10 I.L.M. at 290, 291 (declaring that
import, export, or transfer of ownership contrary to Convention's principles is "il-
licit" and requiring measures to prevent national institutions' acquisition of illegally
exported artifacts).
55. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 823 U.N.T.S. at 232, 10 I.L.M. at
289. The UNESCO Convention's sixty-four signatory nations include Canada, the
United States, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Mexico, Peru, the Soviet Union, and Zaire. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 299-300 (Jan. 1, 1990). Following World War II,
nations recognizing the need for an agreement to protect cultural property during
conditions of war met at The Hague and prepared an agreement that culminated in
the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict, The Hague, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (the "Hague Convention").
56. See infra notes 58-186 and accompanying text (discussing conflict); see also
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 291 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating principle that even good faith pur-
chaser for value acquiring stolen item receives no title); Kunstsammlungen Zu Wei-
mar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2nd Cir. 1982) (same); Heckle v. Lurvey, 101
Mass. 344, 345 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1869) (same); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867
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cerning personal property does not distinguish between acces-
sioned artifacts and privately owned art works to determine
whether common law, equitable principles, or the CPIA should
apply in a particular case.57
II. COMMON LA W PRINCIPLES IN ART THEFT DISPUTES
U.S. state and federal courts apply state common law prin-
ciples of conversion and equitable principles to international
disputes involving the return of cultural property.58 Under
common law, the tort of conversion only applies to serious in-
terferences with the chattel of the plaintiff sufficient to justify a
forced judicial sale to the defendant. 59 In conversion, posses-
sion of the chattel has been transferred to a wrongdoer, leav-
ing the true owner with the right to recover the chattel itself in
a replevin action, or to recover damages.6°
Due to the unique and irreplaceable nature of cultural
(N.J. 1980) (same); Basset v. Spofford, 45 N.Y. 387, 391 (1871) (same); Menzel v.
List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (same), modified as to damages, 279 N.Y.S.2d
608 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd as to modification, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). See generally
DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.7, at 281-83 & n.l (1973).
57. U.S. state and federal courts apply common law principles to all disputes
involving the recovery of stolen art works in a replevin action, regardless of whether
the item is cultural property accessioned to a public institution of a UNESCO signa-
tory nation. See infra notes 58-186 (discussing common law).
58. SeeAutocephalous, 917 F.2d at 286 n. 10 (applying Indiana statute that codified
common law tort principle); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir.
1987) (same), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 613
(7th Cir. 1986) (applying tort law conversion principles); Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1160
(upholding common law principle that even good faith purchaser does not acquire
title to stolen art); Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum, 762 F. Supp. 44, 47
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying equitable doctrine of laches); Menzel, 49 Misc. 2d at 315
(upholding principle that thief does not pass title even to good faith purchaser).
59. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 15, at 90
(5th ed. 1984) ("[T]he tort of conversion has been confined to those major interfer-
ences with the chattel, or with the plaintiff's rights in it, which are so serious, and so
important, as to justify the forced judicial sale to the defendant which is the distin-
guishing feature of the action.").
60. SeeJ.B. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 313 (1890) (formulat-
ing essence of tort as "one had the property, the other only the right of property");
see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 59, § 15, at 90. U.S. state and federal courts
consider several factors in determining whether a defendant has converted chattel
and whether resulting damages are owed to the plaintiff. Id. First, courts examine
the extent and duration of the defendant's exercise and control over the chattel. Id.
Second, they assess the defendant's intent to assert a right which is in fact inconsis-
tent with the plaintiff's right of control. Id. Finally, courts consider a defendant's
good faith or bad faith. Id.
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property, the wrongfully dispossessed plaintiff generally seeks
return of the chattel.6 1 The plaintiff thus brings an action in
replevin to recover the cultural property rather than an action
at law that allows recovery of the chattel's value as damages.62
Courts in the United States often consider several crucial
procedural and substantive issues in a replevin action for the
recovery of art works. First, courts scrutinize the litigants' duty
of diligence. Second, courts assess the art purchaser's good
faith. 63 Third, courts apply the doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
ment.64
A. Plaintiff's Duty of Diligence
Diligence is an important element of an action to recover
stolen art.65 The term "diligence" is the opposite of negli-
gence. It implies varying degrees of attentive and persistent
attempts on the part of the plaintiff to recover the art work.6 6
Lack of diligence may trigger the statute of limitations and af-
fect the accrual of the cause of action.67 The issue of diligence
may also affect the defendant's equitable defense of laches.68
In addition, some courts impose a duty of diligence on the de-
61. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Allen, 724 P.2d 651, 656 (Colo. 1986); DOBBS,
supra note 56, § 5.13, at 399-400 (1973) (discussing principle that equitable relief is
granted when remedy at law, money damages, is inadequate).
62. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 290 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Indiana statute that
codifies common law). Replevin is defined as "an action whereby the owner or per-
son entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels
from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken or who wrongfully detains such
goods or chattels." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1299 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
63. See infra notes 141-65 (discussing duty to investigate in good faith).
64. See infra notes 166-81 (discussing doctrine of fraudulent concealment).
65. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (discussing that deter-
mination of plaintiff's diligence is central to both discovery rule and fraudulent con-
cealment), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
66. See BIAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 457 (6th ed. 1990) (defining diligence).
67. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 865 (NJ. 1980) (determining that
plaintiff's lack of due diligence affected accrual of action); see also DeWeerth v. Bald-
inger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that statute of limitations was not tolled
due to plaintiff's lack of diligence), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
68. See Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991);
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 875 (6th ed. 1990) (defining laches as neglecting to assert a
claim that with lapse in time causes prejudice to adverse party).
1991-1992] ART THEFT UNDER UNESCO CONVENTION 141
fendant to investigate the art work's title.69
Despite the importance of diligence, U.S. state and federal
courts do not distinguish between an individual and an institu-
tional plaintiff's ability to search for stolen art works. 70 More-
over, diligence requirements vary among the different states
regardless of the plaintiff's status as an individual or an institu-
tion, thereby creating inconsistencies in U.S. jurisprudence. 71
1. Institutional Plaintiff
U.S. state and federal courts consider varying factors to
determine whether the plaintiff's efforts in searching for stolen
art work fulfill the duty of diligence. In Autocephalous Greek-Or-
thodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. ,72 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit defined due dili-
gence as a "substantial and meaningful" investigation under-
taken from the time the plaintiff first became aware of the art
works' disappearance.73 The Seventh Circuit held that "a
cause of action [in replevin] accrues when the plaintiff ascer-
tains, or by due diligence could ascertain, actionable dam-
ages."
74
In Autocephalous, four early Christian Byzantine mosaics
were removed from the Kanakaria Church in war-torn Cyprus,
without church or state authorization. 75 The defendant, an In-
diana art dealer, purchased the four mosaics while on business
in Amsterdam.76 Subsequently, the Kanakaria Church brought
a replevin action in Indiana to recover the artifacts and the dis-
69. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426; Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App. Div. 1979),
aff'd, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981).
70. Compare Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (institutional plaintiff) with O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d
862 (individual plaintiff).
71. Compare Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (not requiring diligence of institutional plain-
tiff) with OKeeffe, 416 A.2d 862 (requiring diligence of individual plaintiff).
72. 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
73. Id. at 290.
74. Id. at 288.
75. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
The court determined that the mosaics were stolen sometime between August 1976
and October 1979. Id. at 1379.
76. Id. at 1381. Plaintiff Goldberg purchased the four mosaics for US$1.08 mil-
lion. Id. at 1401. Upon her return to the United States, plaintiff Goldberg offered to
sell them to the Getty Museum for US$20 million. Id. A representative of the mu-
seum began an investigation that eventually lead to the Cypriot Embassy's discovery
of the mosaics' whereabouts. Id. at 1384-85.
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trict court ordered replevin.77
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's replevin order. 78 The court noted that the ef-
forts initiated by the plaintiff included contacting UNESCO
and prominent art scholars, sending press releases to muse-
ums, and notifying many personal contacts in the art world.79
The court found the action timely and concluded that the
plaintiff had fulfilled its duty of due diligence in searching for
the mosaics.80
Similarly, in Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon,8" the
plaintiff, a government-owned museum located in Germany,
sought the return of two Direr paintings stolen during World
War II.82 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York noted that the museum director had promptly informed
several German art museums and military agencies of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the theft.83 The director had also
contacted U.S. art scholars as well as the Allied and Soviet ar-
mies administering Germany after the war.8 4 Applying New
York law, the district court ordered return of the paintings.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, concluding
that the plaintiff had fulfilled its duty of diligence, affirmed the
judgment of the district court.8 '
In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals, in Solomon R.
Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell,8 6 did not impose a due dili-
77. Id. at 1376.
78. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 279 (7th Cir. 1990).
79. Id. at 281. The court reiterated the district court's findings that plaintiff's
efforts to recover the mosaics were organized and systematic. d. The plaintiff dis-
seminated information as part of an over-all strategy to reach experts and scholars
likely to be involved in "any ultimate sale of the mosaics." d.
80. Id. at 279.
81. 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
82. Id. at 1152-53.
83. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 850-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
84. Id. Germany administered a Central Collecting Points program ("CCP"), in
which the plaintiff participated, which catalogued and stored art works until the own-
ers claimed them. Id. at 851-52. In addition, the plaintiffs contacted the U.S. Depart-
ment of State that undertook efforts to locate the stolen art and publicized their loss
in listings available to museums and galleries. Id.
85. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1165-66 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'g, 536 F. Supp. 829, 858-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
86. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
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gence requirement on the plaintiff.87 In Lubell, the plaintiff
museum found a Chagall gouache missing from its premises
during the mid-1960s.88 The museum did not take steps to lo-
cate the gouache, such as contacting law enforcement agencies
or informing other museums, galleries, and art organizations
of the theft.89 In 1985, the plaintiff learned that defendant
Lubell had purchased the gouache from an art dealer in
1967.9o The museum demanded return of the work, defendant
Lubell refused, and the Guggenheim Museum initiated a re-
plevin action.9
The New York Court of Appeals recognized the difficulty
of crafting a reasonable diligence requirement that could in-
clude all variables in art theft cases.92 Moreover, it believed
that placing the burden of locating art work on the true owner
would encourage illicit trafficking in stolen art.93 Essentially,
the court preserved a plaintiff's right to pursue a replevin ac-
tion by declining to articulate arbitrary rules of conduct to con-
stitute due diligence. 4
87. Id. at 431. In Lubell, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished between
the accrual of an action when the owner seeks recovery from a thief and accrual of an
action brought against a good faith purchaser. Id. at 429-30. The Lubell court articu-
lated the New York rule that in a replevin action against a thief, the action accrues at
the time of theft. Id. In contrast, in a replevin action against a good faith purchaser,
the accrual of the action is deferred until the owner demands the return of the prop-
erty and the defendant refuses its return. Id. at 429. The court noted that under
New York law, demand is a substantive element of the cause of action and that a good
faith purchaser commits no wrong until he has notice of the true owner's claim, and
thereby is given an opportunity to return the chattel. Id.
88. Id. at 427. Webster's New Universal Dictionary defines a gouache as a way of
painting with opaque colors ground in water and mixed with a preparation of gum.
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY 789 (unabr. 2d ed. 1979).
89. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 427 (N.Y. 1991).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 428. The New York Supreme Court had granted defendant Lubell's
cross-motion for summary judgment stating that the statute of limitations barred the
action because the museum used only minimal efforts to locate the stolen art. Id. at
428. On appeal, the New York Appellate Division modified the judgment and held
that the trial court had erred. Id. at 429. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed
the Appellate Division's opinion because several issues of material fact existed and
therefore were inconclusive as a matter of law. d. at 431.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 429-31.
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2. Individual Plaintiff
Some U.S. courts hold an individual plaintiff to the same
standard of diligence required of an institutional plaintiff. The'
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in DeWeerth v.
Baldinger,95 formulated a standard for a plaintiff's diligence
similar to the institutional standard but applied it to an individ-
ual's search for stolen art.96 In the fall of 1945, following the'
departure of U.S. troops from southern Germany, plaintiff
DeWeerth discovered that her Monet painting had disap-
peared.97 Subsequently, the plaintiff began an investigation by
filing a report with the Allied military government in Germany
and the West German bureau of investigations, but her efforts
to locate the Monet from 1945 through 1957 were fruitless.98
In 1981, plaintiff DeWeerth discovered that the painting was
located in New York City and commenced a replevin action in
1983.99
The Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was not
duly diligent in searching for the art work.' The court noted
95. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
96. Id. at 104.
97. Id. at 105.
98. Id.
99. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688, 693-94 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 836 F.2d
103, 105 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988). A catalogue of Monet's
works, located in a German museum, identified the painting and indicated that a New
York art dealer sold the Monet in 1957 to defendant Baldinger. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at
105. Defendant Baldinger, a New York resident, joined the art dealer as a third party
defendant. Id. at 105-06. The court, however, severed the third party action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b). Id. at 106 n.2.
100. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1987) (referring to
plaintiff's investigation as "minimal"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988). The District
Court for the Southern District of New York had determined, however, that plaintiff
DeWeerth had exercised reasonable diligence in locating the painting and ordered
replevin. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 698. In 1946, the plaintiff asked a lawyer whether
it were possible to do anything about the lost painting, and, in 1955, requested that
an art expert initiate a search. Id. at 694-95. Neither the lawyer nor the art expert
pursued the matter and, in 1957, the plaintiff filed a list of the lost art work with the
West German federal bureau of investigations. Id. Based on the circumstances of
the case, the district court found that the plaintiff's failure to pursue the Monet from
1957 until her nephew discovered its whereabouts in 1981 was reasonable. Id. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court.
DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 104.
The Second Circuit in DeWeerth cited Elicofon for support, emphasizing that the
plaintiff in Elicofon undertook a "continuous and diligent search" following "many
channels." Id. at 111. In contrast, the district court in DeWeerth had observed that in
Elicofon "the plaintiff was a government-owned art museum, with resources, knowl-
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that the reports filed with the military government and West
Germany's bureau of investigations consisted only of a stan-
dard form list and a one sentence letter.' The court charac-
terized the plaintiff's inquiries to an attorney and art expert as
general, and emphasized that she failed to pursue the matter
through further investigation.'0 2  Moreover, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff did not take advantage of specific
mechanisms established to locate lost art, and thus could not
recover the painting.10 3
Similarly, in O'Keeffe v. Snyder,'0 4 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey imposed a comparable duty of diligence on an indi-
vidual plaintiff.' 0 5 The plaintiff in O'Keeffe, a now-renowned
North American artist, claimed that three of her works had
been stolen in 1946.106 Soon after the theft, the plaintiff men-
tioned the theft to the director of the Art Institute of Chicago
but did not investigate further. 0 7 In 1972, the plaintiff's agent
reported the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America
and the works were listed in its stolen paintings registry.' 0 8 In
1975, the plaintiff discovered that the missing paintings were
in a New York City gallery.'0 9 In 1976, plaintiff O'Keeffe
brought a replevin action against a New Jersey art dealer who
possessed the works.! 10 The Supreme Court of New Jersey de-
edge and experience that far exceeded any means an individual such as DeWeerth
could undertake in searching for a missing painting." DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 694-
95. The court of appeals, however, labelled the plaintiff a "wealthy and sophisticated
art collector" and suggested that she could have hired someone to mount an exten-
sive investigation. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112.
101. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 11. By contrast, the district court in DeWeerth high-
lighted the following factors to support its finding that plaintiff's search was duly
diligent: plaintiff's advanced age from 1957 through 1981 prevented a more active
search, and the published references regarding the disputed Monet were not gener-
ally circulated to the public. 658 F. Supp. at 694.
102. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111.
103. Id. The Second Circuit noted that the plaintiff failed to notify the Allied
forces' CCP program and did not correspond with the State Department or with the
Trust Administration. Id. The plaintiff argued that the CCP dealt only with property
stolen by Germans and located in Germany, and that therefore it would not have
been helpful in the search. Id. at 111 n.6.
104. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
105. Id. at 872 (focusing on plaintiff's diligence in pursuing property).
106. Id. at 864.
107. Id. at 866.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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termined that these efforts were insufficient and did not fulfill
the plaintiff's duty of diligence."'
Under certain factual situations, some U.S. courts are re-
luctant to place a duty of diligence on the plaintiff. In contrast
111. Id. at 873-74. The trial court had ruled that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 865.
The Appellate Division concluded that the paintings were stolen and dismissed the
statute of limitations defense based on a theory of adverse possession. Id. at 871-72.
The Appellate Division held that the defendants did not prove the open, visible, and
notorious requirement for adverse possession and granted summary judgment to the
plaintiff. Id.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the adverse possession analysis and
determined that the Appellate Division erred by accepting the theft of the paintings
as fact. Id. at 871-72. Although defendant Snyder conceded that the paintings were
stolen, the Supreme Court concluded that a question of material fact existed as to
theft because of contradictory testimony provided by third-party defendant Frank,
the person who had sold the paintings to defendant Snyder. Id.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in O'Keeffe applied the "discovery rule," which
tolls the statutory period until the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should have known
by exercising due diligence, of the cause of action and the possessor's identity. Id. at
870-71. Under this rule, the burden of proof of diligence lies with the plaintiff who
must establish facts that would justify tolling the statute of limitations. Id. at 872.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that the limited record was "fraught with
factual conflict," id. at 865, reversed the lower court's decision, and remanded the
case. Id. at 877.
Justice Handler's dissenting opinion in OKeeffe criticized the due diligence re-
quired by the discovery rule. He observed that the rule required that parties focus on
the collateral issue of tolling the statutory limitations period and become entangled
in extensive, duplicative hearings. Id. at 878. Justice Handler provided an extensive
analysis of the equitable considerations found in a replevin action. Id. at 883-85. He
further noted that although the defendant raised laches as a defense, asserting an
unreasonable delay in commencing the action, the doctrine of unclean hands bars the
defense of laches. Id. Similarly, he noted that equitable estoppel had been applied in
actions involving conflicting claims to legal title of chattels and "[a] thorough balanc-
ing of the equities has been followed specifically to adjudicate the competing claims
for misappropriated works of art." d. at 884. Justice Handler attacked the majority's
holding because it failed to place a "similar duty of diligence or vigilance . . . upon
the subsequent receiver or possessor, who, innocently or not ... actually trafficked in
stolen art." Id. at 878; see also Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257-58 (App. Div.
1979) (discussing equitable principles found in conversion case where art work was
subject to bailment), afftd, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981).
New York has expressly rejected adoption of a discovery rule. Solomon R. Gug-
genheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991). In 1986, the Governor
vetoed Assembly Bill 11462-A that provided for the state's three-year limitations stat-
ute to begin running when an art institution gave notice of possession of an art work.
Id. The Governor was concerned that the statute would not "provide a reasonable
opportunity for individuals or foreign governments to receive notice of a museum's
acquisition and take action to recover it before their rights are extinguished." Id.
The U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department ofJustice, and the U.S. Informa-
tion Agency all recommended the bill's veto. Id.
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to the O'Keeffe decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, in Mucha v. King, 1 2 did not invoke diligence stan-
dards because historical events were unclear. 1 3 In Mucha, a
Czechoslovak artist consigned his painting "Quo Vadis" to a
Chicago art gallery in 1920.1"4 In 1979, the gallery illegally
converted the painting. 1 5  Defendant King subsequently
purchased the painting from an art dealer in 198 1.116 In 1983,
after an investigation prompted by a letter of inquiry sent to
him by an art enthusiast in 1982, plaintiff Mucha, the artist's
son, brought an action for the replevin of "Quo Vadis.""' 7
The court noted that the letter placed the plaintiff on notice of
a probable conversion action and that he had acted promptly
in locating the painting." 18 The Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's action was timely,
tolling the statute of limitations." 19
U.S. state and federal courts apply inconsistent standards
for fulfilling due diligence, thus hindering the plaintiff's right
to replevin of artifacts. Although courts focus on the plaintiff's
conduct in searching for stolen art works, they fail to relate the
efforts to the plaintiff's status and circumstances, thus often
failing to reach the merits of the dispute.
3. The Defense of Laches
The issue of plaintiff's diligence in searching for stolen art
112. 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986).
113. Id. at 604-05. The defendant argued that the facts were uncontested. Id.
The court did not accept the defendant's factual allegations and instead distin-
guished between material facts that are legally significant and "historical" facts that
are not. Id. The court stated that material facts are determined by applying a legal
standard to historical events. Id. The court noted that material facts must be upheld
"unless found to be clearly erroneous." Id.; accord Weidner v. Thieret, 886 F.2d 958,
960 (7th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of the discovery rule, see supra note I11.
114. Mucha, 792 F.2d at 606.
115. Id. at 604.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 613.
118. Id. The Seventh Circuit did not invoke the discovery rule. Instead, the
court noted that it was not practical for the plaintiff to sue earlier and that application
of the rule would place an onerous burden of diligence on the plaintiff to do so. Id.
at 611-12. The Mucha court indicated that "[i]n a case such as this, given the antiq-
uity of the bailment and the fact that many of the principals are dead," the applica-
tion of the discovery rule would be speculative. Id. at 612 (citing O'Keeffe v. Snyder,
416 A.2d 862, 872-73 (N.J. 1980)).
119. Id. at 611-12.
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works is also relevant to the defense of laches. Some U.S. state
and federal courts analyze lapsed time between the theft and
the initiation of suit under the rubric of laches.' 20 Laches is
usually applied to situations in equity where there is no time
bar in law. Thus, the equitable doctrine of laches permits a
defendant to avoid a claim for the return of stolen art that
otherwise is timely.1 21 Under the doctrine, the defendant as-
serts that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing suit
and that the delay prejudiced or disadvantaged the defendant.
Plaintiff's delay must have caused damage to the defendant-
as in the situation where evidence has been destroyed or wit-
nesses have disappeared without having made a statement. l 22
Relief lies in the conscience of the equity court rather than as a
matter of legal right. 2 3
The Court of Appeals of New York in Lubell124 held that
the plaintiff's delay in bringing suit did not bar the action.' 25
The court analyzed the plaintiff's alleged delay in bringing suit
as laches and balanced the defendant's duty to investigate the
validity of the art work's title against the plaintiff's obligation
to search for stolen art work. 126 The court noted that unrea-
sonable delay as well as prejudice to the defendant was one of
the elements of the defense of laches. 127
The New York Court of Appeals noted that on the limited
record equity did not favor either party because the defendants
had diligently investigated the provenance of the gouache
120. See, e.g., Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum, 762 F. Supp. 44, 46
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y.
1991).
121. See DOBBS, supra note 56, at 43-44 (discussing laches).
122. Id.
123. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619
(App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991). The New York Appellate
Division noted that "defendant's vigilance is as much in issue as plaintiff's diligence"
and that the conscience of the court required a thorough inquiry into both parties'
actions. Id. at 623.
124. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
125. Id. at 431. The court noted that New York's statute of limitations could
have barred the action. Id.
126. Id. By comparison, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in DeWeerth
determined that the action was untimely and that therefore the statute of limitations
barred the action. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988). The court did not address the equities of the case and
the impact of laches. Id. at 112 n.7.
127. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431.
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prior to purchase by contacting the artist and his son-in-law. 2 8
The plaintiff, on the other hand, asserted that it deliberately
had decided not to investigate the theft actively due to the
common belief that "publicity often pushes a missing painting
further underground."'' 29 The court stressed the applicability
of the laches doctrine and the need to balance the equities with
regard to the respective litigants.' The court, unable to con-
clude that the museum's conduct was unreasonable as a matter
of law, remanded the case to the trial court.' 3 '
Similarly, in Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum,'32 the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ana-
lyzed the plaintiff's delay in bringing suit in terms of laches.13 3
In that case, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that too much time had lapsed prior to plaintiff's
initiation of suit.' 34 Applying Lubell, the court stated that the
defendant's claim of delay related only to the availability of a
laches defense and not to a defense based on the statute of
128. Id.
129. Id. at 431. The New York Appellate Division noted that "defendant's vigi-
lance is as much in issue as plaintiff's diligence." Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v.
Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 623 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
The Appellate Division was persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that "obvious red
flags" on the bill of sale would have alerted a prudent purchaser to inquire further
into the work's provenance. Id.
130. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y.
1991).
131. Id. At the time of trial, 1987, the defendant Lubell had filed a third-party
complaint against the estate of the gallery owner that had sold her the gouache in the
mid-1960's. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 24, 1991, at
21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.). The defendant alleged that the art gallery breached the warranty
of title and fraudulently represented the gouache's title as clear. Id.
Subsequent to the New York Court of Appeals ruling, the estate's executor
moved to add a statute of limitations defense against both claims and the New York
Supreme Court granted the motion. Id. The defendant opposed the motion to
amend, however, claiming prejudice because she was unable to argue a statute of
limitations defense before the court of appeals. Id. The trial court stated that since
laches applied in this case, the issue could not summarily be decided as an issue of
law but was "a question of fact to be determined at trial." Id. Therefore, the trial
court noted that it was inappropriate "at this time" to consider the defendant's con-
tention that the claim for breach of warranty of title had not accrued, in particular,
because defendant Lubell sought indemnity in the event that the Guggenheim Mu-
seum prevailed at trial. Id.
132. 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
133. Id. at 46-47.
134. Id. at 45.
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limitations. 135 The District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied the defendant's motion because genuine is-
sues of material fact existed concerning the requirement of
prejudice to the defendant. 36
Uncertainty exists in U.S. state and federal courts as to the
standard of diligence required of a plaintiff in searching for
stolen cultural property. 37 In some courts, the statute of limi-
tations bars the action, while in others the defense of laches
permits the litigants a plenary trial on the merits by an inquiry
into the equities of the case.' 38 Moreover, courts do not ad-
dress consistently the issue of the defendant's diligence in in-
vestigating title and also fail to assess fully the art purchaser's
good faith.' 3 9 In addition, courts inconsistently apply the doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment. 40
B. The Defendant's Duty to Investigate Title in Good Faith
A limited number of courts have stated that an art pur-
chaser has a duty to investigate title.' 4 ' Art purchasers often
fail to inquire thoroughly into the provenance of art works
prior to their acquisition. 142 Under common law conversion
rules, the purchaser of an art work, whether in good faith or
not, is vulnerable to a replevin action by the true owner at any
135. Id. at 46-47.
136. Id. at 47; see Constance Lowenthal, Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum
of Art: Arguments on Met's Motion to Dismiss Turkey's Claim, INT'L FOUND. ART RES. REPS.,
July-Aug. 1988, at 9-10.
137. Compare Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring due diligence of
institutional plaintiff) with Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d
426 (N.Y. 1991) (not requiring due diligence of institutional plaintiff).
138. E.g., Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum, 762 F. Supp. 44, 46
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431; cf, O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 884-
85 (N.J. 1980) (Handler, J., dissenting) (recognizing applicability of duty to investi-
gate title to art industry defendant based on equitable considerations).
139. Compare Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431 (requiring defendant to investigate title)
with O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 877 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (not requiring defendant art
dealer to investigate title).
140. Compare OKeeffe, 416 A.2d at 872 (recognizing doctrine of fraudulent con-
cealment but not applying it) with Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 290 (applying doctrine of
fraudulent concealment).
141. See, e.g., Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431; Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259
(1979), aff'd, 421 N.E. 2d 500 (N.Y. 1981).
142. OKeeffe, 416 A.2d at 872 (noting art purchasers' failure to investigate title);
see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing proliferation of art theft dis-
putes and purchasers' neglect in investigating art works' provenance).
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time.' 13 A good faith purchaser of personal property previ-
ously taken wrongfully does not acquire good title against the
true owner. 1
44
Placing the burden of proof on the defendant favors the
true owner but permits the good faith purchaser to show steps
taken to investigate title.'4 5 The New York Court of Appeals in
Lubell held that a defendant can be subject to a duty to investi-
gate title in art theft cases.' 46 The court stated that the defend-
ant bore the burden of proving that the Chagall gouache in
question was not stolen. 147 The court noted that the purchaser
had inquired of the artist and his son-in-law prior to the
purchase in order to confirm the painting's provenance and ti-
tle.' 48 The court stated that a balancing of the equities is re-
quired and that the defendant can appeal to the court's con-
science in equity."' The court of appeals remanded the case
to the trial court to consider the purchaser's good faith con-
duct in investigating title as well as the true owner's delay in
bringing suit. ' 51
The New York Appellate Division in Lubell had also ad-
dressed the issue of whether a purchaser received valid title
from a merchant under the Uniform Commercial Code (the
"UCC"). 15 ' UCC section 2-403(1) provides that a merchant
may transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value. 152
The art gallery obtained the Chagall gouache at issue from a
former mailroom employee of the museum and sold it to the
143. See supra notes 56, 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing common law
principle that not even good faith purchaser can acquire title to chattel from thief).
144. See Porter, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59.
145. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y.
1991).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 2-403(1) (McKinney 1991); Solomon R. Guggenheim
Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 623-24 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 426
(N.Y. 1991); see JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
at 188-90 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing good faith purchasers).
152. See U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1991) (defining good faith as honesty in fact and
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in trade); see also
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 151, at 189 & nn. 12-13 (noting that U.C.C. adheres to
common law rule that purchaser cannot acquire good title from thief).
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defendant. ' 53 The defendant's bill of sale identified the former
museum employee as the previous owner of the gouache, im-
plicating that individual as the thief because no other owners
were listed on the bill.' 54 The court noted that the bill of sale
raised "bright red flags" that should have alerted the pur-
chaser to investigate title prior to purchase.' 55 The Appellate
Division thus concluded that under UCC section 2- 403(1) title
would be transferred if the defendant was a good faith pur-
chaser and only if the piece had not been stolen. 156
In Porter v. Wertz,' 57 the New York Appellate Division clari-
fied the meaning of "good faith" in UCC section 2-
103(1)(b).' 58 The court stated that a good faith purchaser can-
not permit or condone questionable trade practices nor act in-
differently to the provenance of the art work. 159 The plaintiffs
in Porter temporarily loaned a Utrillo painting to a potential
buyer.' 60 The buyer never paid for the painting, yet sold the
piece to co-defendant Feigen, an art dealer, with the assistance
of defendant Wertz.' 61
The Appellate Division emphasized that merchants' apa-
thy concerning their right to sell increases their culpability and
facilitates commerce in stolen art. 62 The court noted that,
even if common in the trade, the practices are inexcusable be-
cause a merchant has a duty to verify the history of art work
before consummating a sale.' 63 Consequently, a merchant
who fails to investigate the provenance of art work is not a bona
fide purchaser and therefore is not protected under the
UCC. ' 64
153. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 623-24.
154. Id. at 624.
155. Id. at 623.
156. Id. at 624. The Appellate Division upheld the common law maxim that
persons deal with property in chattel or exercise possession over it at their peril. Id.;
see Hollins v. Fowler, 7 L.T.R. 639 (Q.B. 1874) (stating common law maxim); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 59, § 15, at 93 (discussing conversion principles and
good faith purchaser).
157. 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 421 N.E.2d 500 (1981).
158. Id. at 257; see supra note 152 (defining good faith pursuant to U.C.C.).
159. Porter, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
160. Id. at 255-56.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 259.
163. Id.
164. Id. The New York Appellate Division noted that the defendant's knowl-
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The duty to investigate the provenance of art work may
lead to the discovery of clouded title. It thus functions as a
prophylactic measure for the good faith purchaser, alerting the
purchaser to an inherently risky transaction and to the conse-
quences of such a purchase.' 65
C. The Doctrine of Fraudulent Concealment
While the plaintiff's duty of due diligence and the defend-
ant's duty to investigate title are based on tort principles, the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment has its origins in equity.' 66
The doctrine estops a defendant from asserting a statute of
limitations defense if the defendant has, either by deceit or by
a violation of duty, concealed material facts and thus prevented
the plaintiff from discovering a possible cause of action.
67
Specifically, the doctrine applies to one who has wrongfully de-
tained or taken property and therefore focuses on the defend-
ant's conduct. 68 U.S. courts, however, have applied the doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment inconsistently to disputes con-
cerning stolen cultural property. 69
edge of a catalogue of Utrillo's works, prior to purchase, could have raised doubts as
to his right to transfer title. Id. The court determined that defendant Wertz, the
party who sold the Utrillo to co-defendant Feigen, had no legal right to possession.
Id. Therefore, even if co-defendant Feigen had made the purchase in good faith, he
would not have received valid title. Id. Thus, the piece's subsequent sale did not
transfer title and the court ordered replevin. Id. Nevertheless, the defendant could
not retrieve the painting because it was located in Venezuela at the time of the action.
Id. The court thus authorized a damages award, to be assessed at a later time. Id. at
257-58 (discussing U.C.C. § 2-403).
165. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y.
1991). The court qualified its holding by stating that its opinion did not suggest that
plaintiff's conduct was no longer an issue in the case. Id. at 431.
166. See generally Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37
BUFF. L. REV. 119, 127-31 (1989).
167. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 288 (7th Cir. 1990).
168. See, e.g., Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 294 (Cudahy, J., concurring); O'Keeffe v.
Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872-73 (NJ. 1980) (explaining that doctrine functions to toll
statute of limitations where chattel is fraudulently concealed from plaintiff); 37 AM.
JUR. 2D §§ 144-46 (2d ed. 1968) (discussing common law fraud and deceit in relation
to concealment).
169. See Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 294 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (noting applica-
bility of doctrine to toll statutory limitations period until original owner has actual
knowledge of identity of possessor of stolen or lost art work). But see O'Keeffe, 416
A.2d at 872 (recognizing doctrine's function and applicability to medical malpractice
but not to stolen art work).
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In Autocephalous, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit did not disturb the lower court decision to invoke the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 7 ' The district court in
Autocephalous had found several facts material to the issue of
fraudulent concealment. The mosaics were removed from the
Kanakaria Church without church or state authorization some-
time between August 1976 and October 1979. t17 The accused
thief misrepresented the provenance of the mosaics by claim-
ing the mosaics were from Turkey.172 Moreover, although the
thief returned four pieces of mosaic, the government of Cyprus
determined that two of the returned pieces were not genu-
ine. 173
The district court concluded that the doctrine of fraudu-
lent concealment tolled the statute of limitations. 74 It ruled
that the plaintiffs reasonably could not have been on notice of
the cause of action or of the possessor of the mosaics. 7 5 Fur-
thermore, the mosaics were stolen and did not resurface for
nine years, a period of time that indicated "by its very nature"
that the art work was fraudulently concealed from the true
owner.' 76 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found
no error in the district court's application of the doctrine of
170. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 290, aff'g 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1392 (S.D. Ind.
1989) (holding that Indiana law required that defendant actively conceal stolen prop-
erty's location and that plaintiff undertake diligent search). The concurring opinion
emphasized that the limitations statute is tolled until the original owner has "actual
knowledge" of both the property's location and the identity of the possessor. 917
F.2d at 294 (Cudahy, J., concurring). But see Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v.
Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1163 n.23 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing General Stencils, Inc. v.
Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that defendant not required to con-
ceal property affirmatively in order to toll statute of limitations)).
171. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th
Cir. 1990).
172. Id. at 1390. According to the testimony of an art dealer who carried out
Cyprus's investigation, the alleged thief lied about possessing the Cypriot mosaics.
Id. After a confrontation, however, the alleged thief agreed to turn over the mosaics.
Id.
173. Id. (noting that, according to witness' testimony, alleged thief claimed that
he returned all mosaics in his possession). Cyprus, upon learning of the theft, imme-
diately contacted UNESCO and many other international organizations in a world-
wide attempt to alert the art industry of its investigation. Id. at 1379-80.
174. Id. at 1391.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1392.
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fraudulent concealment. 177
In Republic of Turkey, the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York also addressed the issue of fraudulent
concealment. 7 8 The court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss because a question of material fact existed as to
whether the defendant had fraudulently concealed the artifacts
at issue in the case. 179 Instead, the district court required the
litigants to undertake discovery and proceed to trial to address
the issue of fraudulent concealment among other issues of ma-
terial fact. 180
In contrast, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in O'Keeffe
did not fully address the issue of fraudulent concealment.' 8 '
The court recognized that if a chattel is concealed from the
true owner, fairness requires the tolling of the statute during
the concealment period. 8 2 The pieces stolen in 1946 were
three small paintings that the plaintiff argued could be moved
and concealed easily.' 83 Due to inconclusive evidence and the
existence of a question of fact as to actual theft, the court did
not invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 84 Further-
more, the Supreme Court of New Jersey failed to require dis-
covery as to the doctrine's possible application on remand of
the case to the trial court. 8 5
Courts inconsistently apply the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment in art theft disputes. Similarly, courts disagree as
to the standard of diligence required of the plaintiff in search-
177. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 290 (7th Cir. 1990).
178. Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum, 762 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
179. See id. at 46-47.
180. Id.
181. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872-73 (NJ. 1980). Similarly, the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey's Appellate Division failed to apply the doctrine of fraudu-
lent concealment in O'Keeffe. Although the Appellate Division had determined that
the paintings were stolen and that their whereabouts remained unknown until 1976,
it did not invoke the doctrine. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 405 A.2d 840, 841 (App. Div.
1979), rev'd, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
182. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
183. Id. at 871.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 865 (noting that limited record was replete with factual conflict). The
NewJersey Supreme Court applied the discovery rule to determine the accrual of the
action. See id. at 873; supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing discovery
rule).
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ing for stolen cultural property, often failing to distinguish be-
tween institutional and individual plaintiffs. In addition, courts
fail to scrutinize the purchaser's conduct to determine whether
it undertook a good faith effort to investigate the provenance
and title of the art work prior to the purchase.'8 6
III. THE NEED FOR UNIFORM STANDARDS
The inconsistent application of principles of law and eq-
uity by U.S. state and federal courts in art theft disputes dem-
onstrates the need for uniform standards. Although, the
UNESCO Convention urges a spirit of international coopera-
tion, incongruous adjudications of factually similar situations
frustrate this goal."8 7 The Convention recognizes that signa-
tory nations have an indefeasible right to recover objects regis-
tered in government-controlled repositories.8 8 These collec-
tions represent a nation's inalienable "moral property."'' 8 9
The Convention provision requiring just compensation of an
innocent purchaser more consistently facilitates the return of
cultural property to the true owner. 90
Uniform standards in adjudicating international art theft
disputes are necessary to effectuate the UNESCO Conven-
tion's goals of impeding the illicit art trade and of assisting sig-
natory nations to recover stolen or illegally exported cultural
property.' 9 ' The application of uniform standards to an action
186. Compare O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869-70 (N.J. 1980) (discussing
diligence requirements and purchaser's good faith) with Autocephalous Greek-Or-
thodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 289, 291 (7th
Cir. 1990) (discussing diligence requirements and purchaser's good faith).
187. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(1), 823 U.N.T.S. at 236, 10
I.L.M. at 290 (stating that "international co-operation constitutes one of the most
efficient means of protecting each countries [sic] cultural property"); see ARTHUR TAY-
LOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, at vii (2d ed.
1977) (quoting Dean Roscoe Pound) (urging jurists to use comparative law method
to address present and future international problems).
188. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, art. 13, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 244, 10
I.L.M. 289, 291-92; see supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing article 13).
189. Preliminary Report of the UNESCO Convention, UNESCO Doc. SHC/
MD/3, at 10, para. 74 (1969) [hereinafter Preliminary Report].
190. Id.
191. See Final Report, UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5, Annex I, at 17 (1970) (dis-
cussing bona fide purchaser and noting Swedish legal principles according to which
right to movable property is not subject to prescription); cf. Saul Levmore, Variety and
Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987) (stat-
ing that uniform application of rule explains its function).
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for the recovery of cultural property would provide a measure
of certainty in U.S. jurisprudence and would contribute to con-
sistent and fair judgments in international controversies. 129
U.S. state and federal courts should, guided by Conven-
tion principles, adopt a uniform approach to adjudicating com-
plex cultural property disputes. In replevin actions, state and
federal courts should evaluate the plaintiff's diligence based
on its status as an institution or an individual. Second, courts
should consistently apply the doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
ment. Third, courts should scrutinize the defendant pur-
chaser's good faith. By applying each of these three factors in
every case, courts would foster a plenary trial on the merits
and a thorough inquiry into the defendant's good faith, an ap-
proach that is consistent with both the obligation of signatory
nations under the UNESCO Convention and judicial practice
in many countries.1 93
A. Due Diligence Based on Plaintiff's Status
The application of a due diligence standard to plaintiff's
search for stolen cultural property must take into account the
plaintiff's status. 194 The Second Circuit's decisions in Elicofon
and DeWeerth subjected parties who are not similarly situated to
192. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 187, at 93-94 (explaining that draft-
ers of German Civil Code included Roman law concepts based on boni mores such as
"good faith" and "fairness" thus allowing flexibility in judicial determinations).
193. See Preliminary Report, supra note 189, para. 73 (1969). The UNESCO
Convention's preliminary draft report states that the purchaser is presumed to be in
good faith and the burden of proving an absence of good faith is on the party seeking
recovery of the item. Id. The report further emphasizes that this view is consistent
"with judicial practice in many countries," and that as a result the Convention should
require that fair compensation be made to the bona fide purchaser for return of the
property. Id. See generally Constance Lowenthal, UNIDROIT Proposes Art Recovery
Convention, IrN'L FOUND. ART RES. REPS., Aug.-Sept. 1991, at 5-6 (reporting on in-
ternational legal effort supported by UNESCO to supplement current Convention).
194. Compare DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1056 (1988) with Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp.
829, 849-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (demonstrating application of similar duty of diligence
without regard to plaintiff's status), aff'd, 836 F.2d Ill (2d Cir. 1982). The Second
Circuit in DeWeerth failed to acknowledge that the plaintiff, an individual, had limited
resources with which to conduct a continuous search over an extended period of
time. In contrast, the plaintiff in Elicofon, a state-owned museum, had access to vast
resources in conducting a search for the missing art works. See supra note 100 (dis-
cussing diligence standards applied by district court and court of appeals in
DeWeerth).
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the same standard of diligence in their search for stolen art.' 95
Instead, courts should apply a balancing test to determine
whether a plaintiff seeking the recovery of stolen art fulfilled its
duty of diligence. Courts should balance the plaintiff's delay
in bringing suit against the plaintiff's practical difficulties in
commencing the action at an earlier time.' 96 To evaluate these
difficulties, courts should look to factors such as the plaintiff's
age, health, financial ability to undertake an extensive search,
and access to witnesses. The court should view the plaintiff's
circumstances in their totality and take into account the plain-
tiff's status as an institution or an individual, thus allowing
greater flexibility in judicial determinations.197
In O'Keeffe, the Supreme Court of New Jersey failed to con-
sider the plaintiff's practical difficulties in bringing a replevin
action at an earlier point in time.' 98 The court's diligence stan-
dard did not take into account the plaintiff's status and circum-
stances and imposed an onerous duty of diligence on an indi-
vidual with limited resources. 99 Consequently, the court
195. See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109. The DeWeerth court would enforce a blanket
rule of reasonable diligence on all plaintiffs because much art is maintained in private
collections where it is both unadvertised and unavailable to the public. Id. The "rea-
sonable" diligence standard adopted in DeWeerth, however, is unreasonable, particu-
larly as applied to an individual plaintiff. See Robert A. Barker, Rights Involving Stolen
Art, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 25, 1991, at 6. No matter how diligent that individual may be in
attempting to ferret out stolen art work, if the work is kept in an unadvertised private
collection, the inherent difficulties involved in locating the art creates an onerous
duty of diligence on plaintiffs. See id.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit assumed that plaintiff DeWeerth
had the financial resources to retain an agent to conduct a broad and thorough inves-
tigation to locate the Monet. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109. The court did not indicate
that plaintiff could afford such an expenditure, however, and characterized the plain-
tiff as wealthy because of property holdings in Germany. Id. at 112.
196. See supra notes 112-19 (discussing Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir.
1986), where court concluded that passage of time created evidentiary and practical
problems, thus not requiring plaintiff to commence suit earlier).
197. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 187, at 93-94; see also INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW ("UNIDROIT"), Preliminary
Draft Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, Study LXX/
Doc. 19 (1990), art. 2 (providing that diligence determination relate to "relevant cir-
cumstances of the acquisition," including character of parties) [hereinafter
UNIDROIT, Preliminary Draft Convention].
198. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 866 (N.J. 1980).
199. See id. at 884-85 (Handler, J., dissenting) (noting special pertinence of equi-
table considerations requiring fullest exposure of all facets of controversy); see also
supra note I l1 (discussing discovery rule). The diligence requirements imposed by
the discovery rule may likely preclude courts from hearing the merits of a case.
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failed to reach the merits of the case.200
Application of the balancing test, on the other hand,
would have allowed the court to reach the merits. Seemingly,
plaintiff's thirty-year delay in bringing suit appears to be per se
unreasonable. Although the death of key witnesses prior to
the commencement of suit created problems of proof for the
plaintiff and thus hindered her case, this factor is not conclu-
sive as to the facts of the case.2 0 ' Thus factors such as plain-
tiff's status as an individual, her inability to mount an extensive
investigation over an extended period of time, limited financial
resources at the time of theft, and the art industry's lack of reli-
able mechanisms to register and recover stolen art at the time
of loss, posed practical difficulties in locating the art works.20 2
In weighing these factors against the plaintiff's delay in bring-
ing suit, the plaintiff could be considered to have been duly
diligent as these factors reveal the plaintiff's many practical
difficulties in searching for the paintings. Therefore, viewed in
light of the totality of the circumstances and considering plain-
tiff's status, the O'Keeffe court should have proceeded to hear
the merits of the case. 20 3
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Mucha did not place an onerous burden of diligence on
an individual plaintiff bringing a replevin action. 20 4 The his-
torical events in Mucha are similar to those present in O'Keeffe.
First, the loss occurred several decades before the suit, and key
O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 884-85. Consequently, a trial court may not reach relevant alle-
gations, such as the alleged thief's implication in several art thefts. Id. at 865. In
effect, the Supreme Court of New Jersey required an inordinate duty of diligence
from the true owner to prove facts which had been obscured with the passage of
time. Id.
200. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 884-85.
201. See id. at 865-66 (noting that plaintiff's colleagues at time of paintings' theft
had died and therefore evidence and credible testimony to corroborate plaintiff's
claim of theft was scarce).
202. See id. 884-85 (Handler, J., dissenting).
203. Cf. id. at 880-81 (Handler, J., dissenting) (stressing that discovery rule does
not discourage art theft and promotes right of true owner to seek return of stolen art
works). In OKeeffe, the majority ignored the common law maxim that good title can-
not be acquired from a thief, or even by a good faith purchaser. Id. at 881 (Handler,
J., dissenting). Instead, it provided a "convoluted" rendition of the law of statutory
limitations periods and the doctrine of adverse possession. Id. at 881 (Handler, J.,
dissenting); see supra note Ill (discussing discovery rule); see also Gerstenblith, supra
note 166, at 127-31 (discussing discovery rule).
204. Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1986).
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witnesses to the controversy had died in the interim period.20 5
Second, the circumstances in Mucha posed practical difficulties
for the plaintiff because, as a citizen and resident of Czechoslo-
vakia, and as an individual unfamiliar with the art trade, he was
not on notice of a possible conversion until a letter of inquiry
alerted him.20 6 In addition, the plaintiff did not have reason-
ably facile access to the U.S. art industry's mechanisms that fa-
cilitate recovery of lost or stolen art.20 7 In light of the plain-
tiff's status and circumstances, the Seventh Circuit correctly
determined that the plaintiff was duly diligent in bringing the
replevin action.2 08  The application of the balancing test to
similar facts in other art theft disputes would facilitate a ple-
nary trial on the merits.
Courts adjudicating art theft disputes correctly focus on
the plaintiff's evidence of steps taken in seeking the stolen
art.20 9 A burdensome diligence standard, however, may bar a
plenary hearing on the merits and frustrate the goal of recover-
ing stolen art. The due diligence balancing test provides a rea-
205. Id. at 612 (determining that bailment occurred several decades before
plaintiff brought suit and that artist who consigned painting died many years before).
206. Id. at 607, 612-13.
207. See id. at 609-11 (describing Czech plaintiff's life in Europe and unfamiliar-
ity with U.S. art industry until visit to United States in 1973 to attend exhibition of
father's work).
208. See id.
209. But see O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 873 (N.J. 1980). The Supreme
Court of New Jersey in O'Keeffe also articulated a due diligence standard that empha-
sized the value of the stolen art work, stating that the "nature and value of the per-
sonal property" affects the meaning of due diligence. Id. As an example, the court
stated that a theft report of moderately-valued jewelry would fulfill the owner's duty
of diligence. Id. With regard to art work, however, the court required greater dili-
gence because of the property's greater value and thus proposed a proportional anal-
ysis in which the greater the value of the property, the greater the diligence required
of the owner. Id.
The difficulty inherent in determining the value of cultural property due to the
art industry's volatile pricing and the existence of often priceless art treasures makes
pecuniary evaluations irrelevant in art theft disputes. These evaluations are also un-
related to the true owner's or a signatory nation's right to bring suit to recover stolen
cultural property. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing UNESCO
Convention's article 13). A reasonable standard of diligence must be related to
plaintiff's conduct and its status, and not to what the disputed property is worth. See
supra notes 65-119 and accompanying text (discussing diligence standards for plain-
tiffs). For example, in DeWeerth v. Baldinger, the Second Circuit concluded that an
individual plaintiff had not met its duty of diligence because it failed to pursue an
extensive investigation, and not because of the value of the Monet. See supra notes
100-03 and accompanying text (discussing court's diligence determination).
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sonable standard that considers the totality of the circum-
stances and fosters a plenary hearing on the merits. 210 As a
result, the test facilitates just adjudications of factually com-
plex disputes concerning stolen cultural property.
B. Courts'Approach to Defendants
1. Invoking the Doctrine of Fraudulent Concealment
U.S. courts should apply the doctrine of fraudulent con-
cealment in cultural property disputes to further the UNESCO
Convention's goal of obstructing the illicit movement of cul-
tural property. The doctrine is particularly well suited to cul-
tural property disputes where the location of valuable
treasures has been concealed or misrepresented.2 t ' In Republic
of Turkey, the court recognized that genuine issues of material
fact existed regarding the defendant's bona fide purchase of
Turkish artifacts and the plaintiff's assertion that the museum
engaged in "misrepresentations and other acts of conceal-
ment. '21 2 In such circumstances courts should invoke the doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment. 21
3
To apply the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, courts
must examine the circumstances surrounding the theft and the
subsequent commencement of suit. 2 14 A defendant should be
estopped from unfairly benefitting from a statute of limitations
defense where it had concealed the cause of action, precluding
the plaintiff from bringing suit.21 5 By invoking the doctrine,
courts provide the opportunity for a plenary trial on the mer-
210. See supra notes 194-2 10 and accompanying text (discussing due diligence
balancing test for uniform standards).
211. See Hennessee, supra note 3, at 43 (noting Swiss investment consortia that
buy art for investment purposes and store it in vaults for years).
212. 762 F. Supp. 44, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
213. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1392, aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
The district court emphasized that the reappearance of the stolen mosaics nine years
later implied a fraudulent concealment. Id. The court also required that the plaintiff
undertake a reasonably diligent search for the stolen artifacts. Id.
214. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 885 (N.J. 1980) (Handler, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that small paintings' mysterious disappearance occurred several decades
prior to plaintiffs' ability to identify possessor and commence suit).
215. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621
(App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430-31 (N.Y. 1991) (discussing fairness con-
cerns similar to those espoused by Justice Handler in OKeeffe dissent, 416 A.2d at
883-85).
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its, thus allowing litigants to "get to the heart of the mat-
ter."
2 16
2. The Duty to Investigate Title in Good Faith
An art purchaser has a duty to investigate the provenance
of art work prior to its purchase.21 7 A requirement to investi-
gate title dictates that a purchaser must take good faith meas-
ures to fulfill a reasonable duty of diligence.2 18 As measures of
good faith, the purchaser should inquire into the history of
ownership of the piece or request a certificate of right to pass
title from the seller.2 19 Additionally, the purchaser may evalu-
ate the seller's reputation and negotiate a clause that protects
the purchase against the economic consequences of a subse-
quent third party claim. 22' The purchaser should request a
formal search from art organizations, such as the stolen paint-
ings registry of the International Foundation for Art Research
(the "IFAR"), the Art Dealers Association of America, or the
Art Loss Registry (the "ALR"). 22 t Furthermore, an inquiry of
the country of origin or of the living artist is a reasonable
method to ensure that the artifact's title is clear.222
216. OKeeffe, 416 A.2d at 885 (Handler, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's de-
cision because it did not allow parties to reach merits of case).
217. E.g., id. at 878 (Handler, J., dissenting) (discussing defendant's alleged ig-
norance of art work's provenance as unreasonable); Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431 (articu-
lating caveat that defendant's vigilance was in issue thus indicating importance of
title search).
218. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400-04 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (according to Swiss
substantive law, purchaser is required to show steps taken to investigate artifact's
provenance), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990); Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254,
257-59 (App. Div. 1979) (requiring defendant to investigate provenance of painting),
aff'd, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981); I. WILLIAMS, SOURCES OF LAW IN THE SWISS CIVIL
CODE 27 (1976). Under Swiss substantive law, bonafides is an "essential element" for
protecting rights. d. Consequently, a presumption of good faith exists and the
judge has broad discretionary powers to decide whether the defendant acted in good
or bad faith. Id.
219. See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1390-91 (discussing evidence of steps
taken in good faith to investigate title); see also Stephen E. Weil, Repose, INT'L FOUND.
ART RES. REPS., Aug.-Sept. 1987, at 6-7 (discussing rights to stolen art).
220. See Weil, supra note 219, at 6-7 (discussing rights to stolen art).
221. See id. (discussing rights to stolen art); see also Art Theft Seen Rising When
Europe Unifies, J. COMM., Sept. 17, 1991, at 3A (discussing London-based ALR's im-
pact in aiding recovery of stolen art).
222. See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1399-1400 (discussing evidence of steps
taken in good faith to investigate title).
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Authorities in the international art trade agree with the
New York Court of Appeals ruling in Lubell, which places the
burden of inquiry into an art work's title on the defendant
good faith purchaser. 22' The IFAR has indicated that, in light
of the international art trade's known proclivity for defective
title, purchasers are expected to protect themselves by verify-
ing title with certified documentation. 224 This requirement is
consistent with society's interest in discouraging art theft and
promotes the UNESCO Convention's goals of impeding the il-
licit art trade and preserving the cultural heritage of signatory
nations. Absent this affirmative duty to investigate title, a pur-
chaser or possessor with a "checkered background" may ac-
quire title to stolen art more easily than a true owner may
regain its possession. 225
Finally, in determining whether a defendant has
purchased stolen art in good faith, courts should distinguish
between an individual purchaser and the better positioned par-
ties that participate in the art trade, such as museums, art gal-
leries, dealers, and auction houses.226
3. Standard for Defendant in the Art Industry
Nevertheless, due to their intimate knowledge and exten-
sive resources, entities and individuals in the art industry
223. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y.
1991) (placing burden to investigate title on purchaser); cf. William Honan, Judge
Clears Way for Trial Over Turkish Art at Met, N.Y. TiMEs, July 20, 1990, at C25 (noting
IFAR executive director's comment that museums and art purchasers should be "ex-
ceedingly careful" to establish themselves as good faith purchasers).
224. See Weil, supra note 219, at 6-7 (stating that innocent purchaser should bear
loss for voluntary entry "into a transaction to acquire material of type that is known
sometimes to be problematic" because purchaser should request and receive docu-
mentation, negotiate arrangement that may protect against economic consequences
of subsequent third party claim, and weigh vendor's title); see also William Honan, Art
Dealer Told Again to Return Mosaics, N.Y. TiMES, October 26, 1990, at C17 (noting that
executive director of IFAR commended judges for Autocephalous decision that re-
quired purchaser to investigate seller; IFAR director also commented that purchasers
need to request search from IFAR, procure authenticity of title from disinterested
party, and require seller to provide title warranty clause in sales contract).
225. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 878 (Handler, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing defendant art dealer's failure to investigate title).
226. See Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259 (App. Div. 1979) (emphasizing
that commercial indifference diminishes integrity and increases culpability of
merchant), aff'd, 421 N.E.2d 500 (1981). The court in Porter held the defendant art
dealer to a higher standard. Id.
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should be held to a higher standard of good faith in their deal-
ings and investigations of title. Courts should require the de-
fendant to show that it acted as a reasonably prudent pur-
chaser in the art industry by providing evidence of substantial
steps taken to verify the validity of title.227
The dissent in O'Keeffe specifically questioned whether the
defendant had acted with the requisite care and "reasonable
prudence" of a responsible person in the art world. 228 First,
the defendant failed to trace the provenance or history of pos-
session back to the living artist. 229 Second, the defendant, a
professional art dealer, made no attempt to verify title prior to
the purchase by contacting the Art Dealers Association of
America, where the paintings were listed as stolen at the time
of the sales transaction.23 °
A showing of substantial steps provides a uniform ap-
proach to determine whether a defendant has fulfilled its duty
of diligence to investigate title and thus whether it has acted in
good faith. As evidence, courts should require steps such as an
inquiry of the living artist or governmental authority from the
artifact's country of origin, a certificate of title or provenance
of the artifact, and a formal search from at least two major art
theft registries, such as the IFAR, the ALR, Interpol, or the Art
Dealers Association of America. Requiring an art industry pur-
chaser to provide evidence of substantial steps taken in good
faith serves to preclude an unscrupulous defendant from prof-
iting from "sharp trade practices."' 23 ' The test also discour-
227. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400-04 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd on other
grounds, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990). Under the district court's Swiss law analysis,
the defendant art dealer was required to show steps taken to investigate title to the
mosaics because of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the sale. Id. at 1400-
04. The analysis delineated an objective standard to determine the good faith of a
buyer. Id. The district court concluded that the suspicious circumstances surround-
ing the purchase of the mosaics would cause "an honest and reasonably prudent
purchaser in [defendant] Goldberg's position to doubt [seller] Dikman's capacity to
convey property rights to the mosaics." Id. at 1404.
228. OKeeffe, 416 A.2d at 885 & n.4.
229. Id. at 866 (discussing defendant's conduct).
230. Id. at 877 (Sullivan,J., dissenting) (noting that defendant art dealer claimed
ignorance of existence of stolen art registry).
231. See Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (App. Div. 1979) (determining
that defendant's failure to investigate title was inexcusable because it had commercial
duty to refrain from sharp trade practice), aff'd, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981).
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ages negligent practices that facilitate art theft and is therefore
consistent with the UNESCO Convention's goal of obstructing
the illicit transfer of cultural property. 23 2
C. Reconciling the Common Law Treatment of the Good Faith
Purchaser with Article 7(b)(ii)
The international nature of art theft disputes requires that
U.S. courts view the UNESCO Convention in light of basic
principles of law shared by both civil and common law coun-
tries. 33 However, article 7(b)(ii), which provides for just com-
pensation to an innocent purchaser, conflicts with the common
law principle that an innocent purchaser acquires no title from
a thief.2 3" Thus, under the common law action for replevin, an
innocent purchaser can be compelled to return the chattel to a
plaintiff without receiving compensation.235 Unless a treaty ex-
ists between the United States and another state party that al-
lows for the return of artifacts without compensation, this pro-
vision may often pose difficulties for U.S. state and federal
courts.23 6
232. See Final Report, UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5, Annex I, at 20-21 (discussing
Convention's goals in U.S. delegate's response).
233. See RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD TODAY 155 (3d ed. 1985). Commentators have noted that "[t]he quest for
law is a task to be accomplished by all jurists in common, each acting in a given
sphere and using his own techniques, but always inspired by a common ideal-that of
arriving, in each instance, at the solution which best conforms to the general sense of
justice-a justice founded upon a reconciliation of all kinds of interests of private
individuals and those of the community at large." Id.
234. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 240, 10 I.L.M. 289,
291. Article 7(b)(ii) allows for the just compensation of an innocent purchaser of
stolen properiy or of one with valid title upon recovery of cultural property. Id. at
238, 10 I.L.M. at 291; codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2609(c)(1)(A) (1988); see supra notes 56,
58-59 and accompanying text (discussing common law principle that thief passes no
title, even to good faith purchaser).
235. See supra notes 56, 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing common law
principle).
236. See 19 U.S.C. § 2609(c)(1)(B) (1988). Section 2609 of the Implementation
Act provides for reciprocal agreements that allow for the return of stolen cultural
property "without requiring the payment of compensation." Id. The conflict be-
tween article 7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention and U.S. common law and statu-
tory rules may be avoided by a treaty between the United States and another State
Party to return stolen cultural property without payment of compensation to the in-
nocent purchaser, to the extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Treaty
Relating to the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cul-
tural Properties, Mar. 24, 1971, U.S.-Mex., art. III, para. 1, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S.
No. 7088, at 3 (providing that upon request of one party other party will employ legal
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Pursuant to Article 13(c) of the UNESCO Convention,2 37
government authorities can bring a civil action on behalf of a
signatory nation to recover lost or stolen cultural property.238
Therefore, pursuant to article 13(c), an action for the recovery
of stolen cultural property is analogous to the common law ac-
tion for replevin.2 39 Nonetheless, in contrast to a replevin ac-
tion, article 7(b)(ii) entitles the innocent purchaser to just com-
pensation for the return of the cultural property. This solution
is also the general rule under the civil law, as expressed, for
example, in the French, German, Swiss, and Italian Civil
Codes.240
means at its disposal to recover and return stolen cultural property); see also S. EXEC.
REP. K, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., para. 3 (1971) (noting that U.S.-Mexico treaty is self-
executing and authorizes U.S. Attorney General to institute civil action in federal
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1988)).
237. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 244, 10 I.L.M. at 291-
92. Article 13 states that
[t]he States Parties to this Convention also undertake, consistent with the
laws of each State:
(a) To prevent by all appropriate means transfers of ownership of cul-
tural property likely to promote the illicit import or export of such property;
(b) to ensure that their competent services co-operate in facilitating the
earliest possible restitution of illicitly exported cultural property to its right-
ful owner;
(c) to admit actions for recovery of lost or stolen items of cultural prop-
erty brought by or on behalf of the rightful owners;
(d) to recognize the indefeasible right of each State Party to this Con-
vention to classify and declare certain cultural property as inalienable which
should therefore ipsofacto not be exported, and to facilitate recovery of such
property by the State concerned in cases where it has been exported.
Id. at 244, 10 I.L.M. at 291-92.
238. S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972) (discussing availability
of civil actions).
239. Id. (according to Congress, true owner may commence civil action and re-
cover property without compensation to good faith purchaser). The article 7(b) im-
port prohibition may create a basis for a cause of action to recover stolen art works.
See S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972) (noting availability ofjudicial
proceedings).
240. See Levmore, supra note 191. Roman and French law provide the principles
applicable in civil law countries to determine the good faith of a purchaser. Id. at 56-
57. Under Roman law, an innocent party could perfect title through usucaption, a
device analogous to common law adverse possession. Id. at 56. A thief or even a
person who obtained title in good faith, however, could not receive title superior to
that of the true owner. Id. at 56-57 & n.39. Similarly, modern French law permits
recovery from a thief. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 2279 (Fr.), in English at THE FRENCH
CIVIL CODE (John H. Crabb trans. 1977); see Levmore, supra note 191, at 57 n.10.
The French Civil Code deviates from Roman law by favoring one who purchases in a
fair and open market or from a merchant established in the sale of a particular type of
1991-1992] ART THEFT UNDER UNESCO CONVENTION 167
This apparent contradiction can be reconciled. The court
should read subsection (b)(ii) in light of the civil law's basic
tenet that presumes the purchaser's bona fides.24" ' This pre-
sumption places the burden on the plaintiff to show the pur-
chaser's lack of good faith.242 A faithful interpretation of the
subsection requires that the court conscientiously determine
property. C. civ. art. 2280; see Levmore, supra note 191, at 57, n.41 (stating that
pursuant to article 2280 one who is not established merchant and sells items sporadi-
cally should arouse suspicion). The true owner can recover the property from the
purchaser but must reimburse the purchaser the price paid. Id. at 57.
The Swiss civil code provides a presumption of good faith favoring the pur-
chaser. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] art. II (Switz.), in English at THE
SWISS CIVIL CODE (Ivy Williams trans. 1976). In addition, art. III permits the judge
broad discretion in adjudicating the issue of good faith. ZGB art. III. See infra note
249 (providing text of article III).
The Italian Civil Code also favors the good faith purchaser. CoDICE CIVILE [C.c.]
art. 1153 (It.), in English at THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE (Mario Beltramo et. al. trans.
1969); see Merryman, supra note 10, at 484 n.17 (noting that Italian law favors good
faith purchaser of painting and not owner from whom it is stolen); see also MANOLO
FRIGO, LA PROTEZIONE DEI BENI CULTURALI NEL DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE 313 (A.
Guiffr6 ed. 1986) (discussing recent Italian case law); Anna Lo Monaco, Sulla Restitu-
zione Dei Beni Culturali Rubati All'Estero, 71 RIVISTA Di DIRrrro INTERNAZIONALE 842,
842-43 & n.l, 852 & n.20 (1988) (discussing two recent contrary court decisions in
which Tribunal of Rome held that antique dealer was in good faith because purchaser
did not exhibit gross negligence when purchasing stolen tapestry; Pretore of Milan
held that antique dealer was not in good faith, and ordered return of furniture to true
owner, because purchaser failed to investigate diligently origin of antique furniture).
The German Civil Code provides for the good faith acquisition of movable prop-
erty from an unauthorized person if the purchaser "had obtained possession" of the
property. BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 932(1) (F.R.G.), in English at THE
GERMAN CIVIL CODE (Ian S. Forrester et. al. trans. 1975). A purchaser, however, "is
not in good faith if he knows, or owing to gross negligence does not know" that the
movable does not belong to the seller. BGB § 932(2). In addition, title is not trans-
ferred if the movable was stolen or lost. BGB § 935(1); see Kunstsammlungen Zu
Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 821, 839-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (analyzing facts pur-
suant to German Civil Code provisions for movables), aff'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d
111 (2d Cir. 1982); see also NORBERT HORN, HEIN K6TZ & HANS G. LESER, Movables, in
GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW, ch. 10, § 2, at 176 (1982).
Under U.S. law, the defendant, even if a "good faith purchaser for value," may
be required to return the artifacts without receiving just compensation. See Kunst-
sammiungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2d Cir. 1982). In Elicofon,
the Second Circuit followed common law tort principles of conversion and granted
replevin to plaintiff despite its acknowledgement that defendant was a good faith pur-
chaser. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Elicofon, however, did not
address the applicability of German law since it determined that New York law ap-
plied. Id.; see supra notes 56, 58-59 (discussing principle that thief does not pass title).
241. See supra note 240; infra note 246 (discussing good faith principle in civil
law countries).
242. See supra note 240 (discussing civil law); infra notes 246-49 (discussing
Swiss Civil Code).
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the purchaser's "innocence" as a prerequisite to payment for
the recovered cultural property.243 Therefore, the court must
focus on the good faith of the purchaser.
Under the common law, however, the court focuses on the
issue of whether the chattel was stolen. 4 4 Consequently, the
court precludes a decision on the issue of the purchaser's good
faith, undermining the validity of the purchaser's claim of in-
nocence.
245
By contrast, under the Swiss Civil Code, for example, a
purchaser is presumed to be bonafide.246 A plaintiff seeking the
return of cultural property can overcome the good faith pre-
sumption, however, by showing that the purchaser failed to in-
vestigate suspicious circumstances, in which case the burden of
243. Webster's Newv Universal Dictionary defines faithful as observant of compact,
treaties, contracts, and conforming to the instrument's letter and spirit. WEBSTER'S
NEW UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY 659 (unabr. 2d ed. 1979). The author uses this term to
emphasize the need for U.S. courts to observe the relationship between the UNESCO
Convention's goal of preserving signatory nations' cultural heritage and article
7(b)(ii)'s purpose to facilitate the return of cultural property when adjudicating cul-
tural property disputes. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. An interna-
tional treaty generally is interpreted in accordance with the principles set forth in
article 31 of the Vienna Convention which states in part that "[a] treaty shall be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. The
context for the pupose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to
the text ... its preamble and annexes." Id.; see also SWEENEY, supra note 26, at 10 18-
19 (discussing treaty interpretation and Vienna Convention). Although the United
States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention, this general rule of treaty interpre-
tation provides an approach for U.S. courts that is internationally acceptable. BARRY
E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 78-79 (1991).
244. See Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE
L.J. 1057, 1057-60 (1954) (noting that "good faith" does not protect purchaser).
245. See id. Professor Gilmore noted that "[a]s the doctrine strikes roots in one
or another field, the 'good faith' component tends to atrophy and the commercial
purchaser is protected with little more than lip service paid to his 'bona fides.' " Id.
at 1057. The severe treatment of the good faith purchaser harkens back to early
American and English cases. E.g., Hollins v. Fowler, 7 L.T.R. 639 (Q.B. 1874); see
supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing common law conversion princi-
ple).
246. ZGB article II states that
Bonafides is presumed whenever the existence of a right has been expressly
made to depend on the observance of good faith. No person can plead bona
fides in any case where he has failed to exercise the degree of care required
by the circumstances.
ZGB art. II; see supra note 240 (discussing Swiss Civil Code); see also DAVID & BRIER-
LEY, supra note 233, at 152 & n.9 (discussing good faith principle).
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proof then shifts to the purchaser.247 The purchaser must
show measures taken in a good faith attempt to overcome rea-
sonable doubts as to the seller's capacity to convey title.248 Ev-
idence of good faith measures must be substantial or the court
may determine that the purchaser either acted in bad faith, or
at the very least, not in good faith.249 If the purchaser does not
prove good faith, the true owner can recover the property pur-
suant to article 7(b)(ii) without paying compensation to the de-
fendant.250 The owner recovers the property because the pur-
chaser was not innocent and thus did not acquire valid title to
stolen cultural property.25 t In these circumstances, article
7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention is consistent with the com-
mon law rule that a thief does not pass valid title because, as in
a replevin action, the purchaser must return the artifacts with-
out receiving compensation. In addition, such a ruling is in
accord with article 13's requirement that judicial actions be
consistent with the laws of the signatory nation.25 2
247. Cf. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400-04 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd on other
grounds, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining Swiss substantive law principles).
The court found many suspicious circumstances surrounding the sale of the mosaics,
including the defendant's knowledge of Turkey's 1974 military occupation of Cyprus,
the fact that the appraised commercial value of the mosaics was significantly higher
than the price paid by defendant, and the rushed sales transaction. Id. at 1400-01.
The court also discredited defendant's testimony that she "fell in love" with the
mosaics upon seeing photographs of them because of eager attempts to sell them for
US$20 million immediately following the transaction. Id. at 1401 n.24.
248. See id. at 1400-04. The district court examined defendant's action in order
to assess its purported good faith. Id. at 1400. First, the court found that the inquiry
with UNESCO was inadequate because defendant failed to verify whether the mosa-
ics were reported as stolen. Id. at 1403. Second, the telephone call to IFAR was not
credible because defendant failed to produce a receipt indicating a formal search or
even the name of the person with whom it had communicated. Id. Finally, the de-
fendant failed to contact the Republic of Cyprus, the first logical step in such an
inquiry, or even a single disinterested authority on Byzantine art. Id. at 1403-04.
249. Id. at 1404 (concluding that defendant failed to take reasonable steps to
resolve doubt as to good faith and therefore did not obtain good title or right to
possession of mosaics); ZGB article III states that
[w]here the law expressly leaves a point to the. discretion' of the judge, or
directs him to take circumstances into consideration, or to appreciate
whether a ground alleged is material, he must base his decision on princi-
ples of justice and equity.
ZGB art. III.
250. S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972).
251. See DOBBS, supra note 56, § 5.13, at 399-400 (discussing common law re-
plevin action).
252. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, art. 13, 823 U.N.T.S. at 244, 10 I.L.M.
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On the other hand, if the purchaser does prove good faith
pursuant to article 7(b)(ii), the innocent purchaser is entitled
to compensation for the return of the cultural property. If a
bonafide possessor must relinquish the property in the interest
of a signatory nation's objective to preserve its cultural heri-
tage, compensation is only just under principles of equity.255
The U.S. Congress's implementing legislation, however, noted
that the legislation would not preempt state law or modify
remedies, thus taking into account the Senate's advice and
consent to the Convention's ratification in 1972.254 Nonethe-
less, Congress's express codification of article 7(b)(ii) evi-
dences an intent to supersede state common law and give pre-
cedence to the international treaty.255 In fact, the U.S. Con-
gress created a statutory basis for the Convention's substantive
remedial provision, article 7(b)(ii), in section 2609 of the
CPIA, and thus effectively modified the long established com-
mon law principle.256 As a result, payment of just compensa-
tion to an innocent purchaser is consistent with the law of the
at 291-92. Article 7(b) obligates the U.S. government to assist in the recovery and
return of cultural property to its country of origin. Moreover, under the article 13
requirement of compatibility with national legislation, the defendant may be entitled
to just compensation under the U.S. Constitution's fifth amendment. See Bator, supra
note 21, at 383-84. The applicable fifth amendment clause states that "private prop-
erty [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Article 7(b)(ii) is consonant with the fifth amendment, as it stipulates that
a purchaser with valid title must be justly compensated for returning artifacts to a
signatory nation's public museum or institution. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2,
art. 7(b)(ii), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. at 291.
Under certain instances, a purchaser may acquire valid title by prescription, a
method of acquiring title based on long and continued enjoyment. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1183 (6th ed. 1990). Generally, in the United States, prescriptive title may
be based on a statute of limitations defense and/or a theory of adverse possession as
applied to chattels. See Gerstenblith, supra note 166; see also O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 405
A.2d 840, 844-47 (App. Div. 1979) (basing its decision on theory of adverse posses-
sion of chattels), rev'd, 416 A.2d 862, 871-72 (NJ. 1980).
253. See RALPH A. NEWMAN, EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPAR-
ATIVE STUDY 205-380 (1973) (discussing equitable principles and good faith); see also
Final Report, UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5, Annex I, at 17 (noting Swedish delegate's
reply concerning legal principles governing movable property).
254. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972).
255. See S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4078, 4099; see supra note 26 (discussing necessity of codification of non-self-execut-
ing treaty in order for treaty to bind U.S. courts).
256. 19 U.S.C. § 2609(c)(1); see Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489,
1493 (1991) (stating that treaties are construed more liberally than private agree-
ments, and to ascertain their meaning, courts may look to history, negotiations, and
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signatory nation, the United States, as required by article 13 of
the Convention. Moreover, the remedial provision of article
7(b)(ii), as codified in the CPIA, preempts any local or state law
contrary to the provision.257
In addition, the legislative history of the U.S. accession to
the Convention evidenced a foreign policy determination to
aid in the preservation of signatory nations' cultural heritage
and to promote a concerted international effort to recover and
return cultural property.258 This policy is not grounded in
common law property rights but in a broad international legal
perspective that considers the right to national "cultural prop-
erty" to be inalienable and essential to the integrity of a na-
tion's culture and civilization. 25 9 The U.S. Congress further
"practical construction adopted by the parties") (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, 397 (1985)).
A U.S. Senate report on the Convention indicates that U.S. customs authorities
are not expected to detect illicit cultural property at international borders; therefore,
in the United States and other countries, judicial proceedings will frequently be nec-
essary to effect recovery. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972).
The Senate understood that article 7(b) permits recovery of stolen artifacts pursuant
to existing U.S. state statutes and common law governing the return of personal
property. See id. Subsection (b) also creates the right to bring actions in federal court
pursuant to CPIA section 2609(c). See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1988).
257. See Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
446, Title 111, 96 Stat. 2351 (1983) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1988)). The
U.S. Congress noted that the Convention was not self-executing and would have no
domestic legal effect except as defined by implementing legislation. S. REP. No. 564,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4101. Upon codifi-
cation, preemption occurs by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of article VI of the U.S.
Constitution, which states in part that "[a]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 872 F.2d 1462, 1480 (11 th Cir. 1990) (dismissing state
common law claim and stating that "[any state law in conflict with a treaty of the
United States is invalid" under Supremacy Clause) (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978)), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
258. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing CPIA legislative
history); see also UNIDROIT, Study LXX/Doc. 14, at 3, para. 6 (1989), in THE INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY. The summary report of the
UNIDROIT study group noted the "capital importance" of protecting cultural prop-
erty. Id. Protection of cultural property is critical because art works are increasing in
value due to the practice of "laundering" money resulting from "closer links between
commerce in works of art and traffic in drugs." Id. Therefore, a policy that discour-
ages the illicit art trade is political in nature. Id. See generally Gordon, supra note 6, at
540-41 (discussing criminal activity engendered by lucrative art trade and difficulty
of law enforcement).
259. See generally Gerte Reichelt, La Protection Internationale Des Biens Culturels, I
REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME 52 (1988). UNIDROIT and UNESCO have undertaken
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recognized the importance of the implementing legislation to
the United States' international cultural relations with close al-
lies.26°
Therefore, rather than applying varying analyses, which
create uncertainty in state and federal courts, the U.S. judiciary
should apply uniform standards in replevin actions to reach
the merits of each case and to inquire thoroughly into the pur-
chaser's good faith. A good faith inquiry on the merits is con-
sistent with article 7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention, the
CPIA, and equitable principles.261
The concept of good faith, a major provision of the Con-
vention, is a fundamental principle shared by civil and com-
mon law countries. 26 2 Its inclusion in the Convention high-
lights its importance to signatory nations in providing an equi-
table remedy designed to facilitate the repatriation of cultural
property. 63 Although these disputes are often factually com-
plex, courts must undertake to uphold the UNESCO Conven-
tion's goal to protect and preserve cultural property.264 The
continuing proliferation of illicitly traded art requires ajudicial
commitment to ensure that national law conforms to interna-
joint in-depth studies of the international protection of cultural property. Id. The
second of these studies focuses on the good faith acquisition of cultural property in
civil law countries. Id. Cultural property may be classified as property "which is res
extra commercium" because of its unique characteristics. Id. at 89. Consequently, it is
not subject to the law which usually governs trade in movable goods. Id. For exam-
ple, in France, property belonging to the "public domain" is excluded from com-
merce, and Law 31.12.1913 concerning historic monuments does not permit acquisi-
tions even in good faith. Id. at 89-91.
260. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. foreign rela-
tions considerations prior to Convention's implementation).
261. See NEWMAN, supra note 253, at 589-650 (discussing application of equitable
principles in civil and common law countries).
262. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(b)(ii), 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 240,
10 I.L.M. 289, 291; see also DAVID & BRIERLEY. supra note 233, at 150-54 (discussing
good faith as super-eminent principle of law).
263. See Reichelt, supra note 259. A UNIDROIT study on the illicit movement of
cultural property explains that, from a private law perspective, the right to payment
facilitates the restitution of stolen cultural property, extends the legal remedies avail-
able to the former owner, and increases the purchaser's risk. Id. at 107.
264. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 823 U.N.T.S. at 232, 10
I.L.M. at 289; see also James A.R. Nafziger, The New International Legal Framework for the
Return, Restitution or Forfeiture of Cultural Property, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 789, 795-
99 (1983) (discussing dispute in New Zealand v. Ortiz, [1984] 1 App. Cas 1 (1983), as
example of case that frustrates UNESCO Convention's purpose because English
Court of Appeal held that retrieval of illegally exported Maori cultural property
"must be achieved by diplomatic means").
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tional law in order both to discourage illegal trading and to
facilitate the return of cultural property to its country of ori-
gin.2 65
CONCLUSION
In adjudicating art theft disputes, courts in the United
States must undertake to create a jurisprudence that embraces
the ideals espoused in the UNESCO Convention. Utilizing
uniform standards to examine the conduct of litigants in a re-
plevin action can provide a basis for just resolution to contro-
versies involving cultural property. The UNESCO Convention
represents a concerted effort to focus international attention
on the importance of the cultural property of nations and in-
still respect for the heritage of all peoples. The U.S. judiciary
must manifest in its decisions both the spirit and the letter of
the UNESCO Convention.
Maritza F. Bolafo*
265. See supra note 257 (discussing Supremacy Clause). For related views, see
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL TREASURES, Doc. 594
(1989), at 3-7 (setting out European Community and international legal frameworks
relating to movement of national treasures and related problems upon completion of
internal market in 1992); id. at 8, para. 24 (noting that "rules laid down by civil law"
concerning movable property would govern recovery of stolen art with "crux" of
problem being bonafide purchaser); UNIDROIT, Preliminary Draft Convention, supra
note 197, arts. 4(1), 8(i) (providing "fair and reasonable compensation" to good
faith purchaser for return of art object); id. art. 9 (creating judicial cause of action
where possessor habitually resides or in State where object is located at time of
claim).
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